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TRUTH, COURAGE, AND OTHER HUMAN
DISPOSITIONS: REFLECTIONS ON FALSEHOODS
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
JONATHAN D. VARAT*
What is the relationship between traditional First Amendment
jurisprudence and the dissemination of factually false statements? Some
recent scholarship, though perhaps ambivalent about whether (or how
much) the former actually may contribute to the latter, suggests that—
especially in this age of the internet and giant social media platforms—the
American free speech tradition offers little assistance in combatting
powerful new threats of falsehoods being circulated widely in the public
domain by virtue of “viral deception.”1 Thus, Professor Frederick Schauer,
in his examination of the relationship between factual falsity and the free
speech tradition, was “left with the conclusion that the seemingly increased
pervasiveness of falsity in public discussion is a phenomenon that may
possibly be a consequence of a strong free speech culture, but is certainly
not a phenomenon that a free speech regime is likely to be able to
remedy.”2 Rather, because the First Amendment “is only a tiny sliver of
communications policy,” it leaves “untouched” the question of “the
increasing acceptance of patent factual falsity, . . . a question whose
economic, psychological, sociological, cultural, scientific, political, and
policy dimensions are far more important than the legal and constitutional
ones.”3
Similarly, though his focus is solely on the realm of political speech,
Professor Tim Wu delineates “a golden age of efforts by governments and
other actors to control speech, discredit and harass the press, and
manipulate public debate” in ways that leave the “First Amendment . . .
confined to a narrow and frequently irrelevant role.”4 This phenomenon
raises “the question . . . when it comes to political speech in the twenty-first

* Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA School of Law.
1. Samuel Hughes, When Lies Go Viral, PENN. GAZETTE, May/June 2017, at 50, 53
(quoting Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Director, Annenberg Public Policy Center, the University
of Pennsylvania).
2. Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 911–12
(2010) (emphasis added).
3. Id. at 918–19.
4. Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete? 2 (Knight First Amendment Inst. at
Columbia Univ., Research Paper No. 14-573, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3096337.
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century, is the First Amendment obsolete?”5 And Professor Richard Hasen
likewise worries that the dark uses of the internet and social media—the
downside of the positive “cheap speech” opportunities such platforms
afford—pose major threats to American democracy, including the
proliferation of false political advertising and so-called “fake news.”6 He is
concerned that, although the “Supreme Court’s libertarian First Amendment
doctrine did not cause the democracy problems associated with the rise of
free speech, . . . it may stand in the way of needed reforms.”7
The observations of these scholars and many others—alarms or clarion
calls if you will—no doubt have a good deal of truth to them, but they also
raise numerous questions even when confined to the perhaps insufficiently
comprehensive context of our First Amendment traditions. First, even if the
premise is correct that, by virtue of modern technology, falsehoods are
more easily and widely disseminated today than in the past, is it clear that
they are therefore more widely accepted than they were in prior eras? That
is an empirical question not necessarily easily answered.
Second, is the volume, velocity, or virulence of falsehoods that would
otherwise exist—and the degree to which they become accepted—
increased, decreased, or largely unaffected by First Amendment
jurisprudence? Answering that question requires analysis of multiple
components: not just what the law is, but what moral incentives and
customs and norms are, how speakers react, how listeners react, and overall
societal reactions, among others.
Third, do elements of our First Amendment jurisprudence support truthtelling in a fashion that offsets the proliferation of falsehoods in a
meaningful way? Fourth, is that jurisprudence a barrier to effective
countermeasures against falsehoods, or can it assimilate and abide
adjustment to lower any barriers without unduly sacrificing the core
purposes and values that gave rise to its adoption and persistence? And
finally (for now), do the customs and approaches signaled by traditional
First Amendment jurisprudence significantly influence the possibilities of
dealing with the worst ravages of proliferating falsehood, even when the
doctrine does not apply directly to the problem?

5. Id.
6. Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy)
16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 200–01 (2018).
7. Id. at 201.
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Answering all those questions comprehensively is too big a haul for a
short essay, and many of them cannot be definitively answered in any
event. But perhaps some partial observations might at least make a start.
I. The Relationship Between Existing Free Speech Protection and the
Proliferation of Falsity
Let’s begin with whether current First Amendment jurisprudence
contributes to the spread of factually false statements, and, if so, how much.
Of course in one sense it does—at least if one accepts the premise that
immunity from liability for falsity makes it likely that more false statements
will be circulated—because free speech and free press rulings since New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan8 have provided constitutional protection in some
areas for falsehoods. But to what degree is this the case, and with what
effect on the spread and acceptance of falsehoods?
The First Amendment guarantees the Supreme Court has extended in the
areas of defamation, false-light privacy, fraud, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, perjury, and false statements to government officials9 no
doubt have allowed the spread of careless and even grossly negligent false
statements of fact to some degree. Given that calculated falsehoods are
largely excluded from those guarantees, however, the full extent to which
these protections have acted as a shield against the spread of falsehoods is
unknown, due to the continued inhibiting effect of the fear of costly and
disruptive litigation over whether the falsehood was knowingly or
recklessly made. And where false statements have been provided First
Amendment immunity, most scholars seem to believe that the risk of
increased circulation of falsehoods is worth the sacrifice to avoid the
chilling effects that permitting sanctions for falsehoods would have on the
circulation of true statements.10 Moreover, the potentially serious abuses of
selective and repressive enforcement that might be aimed by dominant
forces in government or the community—not at the falsity of the statements
but at the speaker’s critical or dissident opinions or the speaker’s
unpopularity—further justify considerable leeway for falsehoods in speech.
That doesn’t diminish the possibility that more false information may be

8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
9. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719–20 (2012).
10. Id. at 751–52 (recognizing that “it is sometimes necessary to ‘exten[d] a measure of
strategic protection’ to [false statements of fact] in order to ensure sufficient ‘breathing
space’ for protected speech.” (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342
(1974))).
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disseminated, but justifiable tolerance of some falsity for larger gains is not
the target of most critiques.
To be sure, there have been some dissenting voices along the way. For
example, we might remember that Justice Harlan wrote separately (though
unsuccessfully) in Time, Inc. v. Hill11 to complain in part that refutation of
inaccurate facts—the “more speech, not enforced silence” part of our free
speech tradition—is much less likely to be forthcoming on the part of
private individuals seeking to pursue their privacy than where the purpose
of refuting falsehoods is to restore reputation.12 And Justice White’s equally
unsuccessful attempt to have the Court reconsider the limitations it had
imposed in defamation cases against both public officials13 and private
individuals caught up in matters of public concern14 spoke to a broader
apprehension that the Sullivan rule “countenances two evils: the stream of
information about public officials and public affairs is polluted and often
remains polluted by false information; and second, the reputation and
professional life of the defeated plaintiff may be destroyed by falsehoods
that might have been avoided with a reasonable effort to investigate the
facts.”15 The policy arguments—the relevance of how much weight should
be given in different contexts to the effectiveness of counterspeech, and the
fear that falsehoods in our public affairs risk degrading the proper
connection between speech and self-governance—may not have prevailed
in those cases, but the concerns they addressed certainly have not gone
away.
The cumulative effect of guaranteed protection for non-calculated
falsehoods in these areas may have contributed some to the spread of
falsehoods, most of it as a justifiable sacrifice for larger public goals and
with offsetting benefits in the form of true disclosures of public importance
that were not deterred for fear of error. But by and large these protections
are decidedly not the target of those who have sounded the alarm about
pervasive and proliferating falsity.16 Nor is their primary focus the arena of
11. 385 U.S. 374, 402 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12. Id. at 407–09.
13. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268.
14. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 362.
15. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 769 (1985)
(White, J., concurring in the judgment).
16. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 2, at 911 (“Arguments from democratic deliberation
or decisionmaking, from autonomy, and from self-expression . . . may accept false speech
and its detrimental effects as a price worth paying in order that people may express
themselves or in order that democratic decisionmaking may remain unfettered.” (footnotes
omitted)); Hasen, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that, although in “the era of cheap speech, some
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deceptive commercial advertising, a vast field where incentives to falsify
and mislead are at their height, but where the Court continues to leave
plenty of regulatory authority untouched by First Amendment limits. As is
well known, “forms of regulation that would be offensive if applied to other
kinds of speech (like requirements that ads be reviewed before they are
published or aired, or that warnings, disclaimers, or other information be
added to ensure accuracy) have been accepted in the case of commercial
speech.”17 And “[p]erhaps most centrally, the First Amendment has been
held to allow the complete prohibition of false, deceptive, and misleading
commercial speech—a wide scope of regulatory power that emphatically
would not be permitted with respect to noncommercial speech on matters of
public concern.”18 With respect to at least one part of that summary, the
relatively recent case Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States
reaffirms that the Court remains largely deferential to governmentcompelled disclosure measures that are reasonably related to the interest in
preventing commercial consumer deception.19 Difficult cases where
commercial speech and arguably ideological speech are intertwined may
elicit greater First Amendment limits, but constitutional restraints in such
cases would likely be justified for the same reasons that apply in the
defamation cases and their progeny.20
Despite the above-discussed cases adopting First Amendment limits in
the context of false statements, until 2012 the Supreme Court had not
extended First Amendment protection to lies—that is, false statements that
the speaker knows to be false when uttered. But then the Stolen Valor Act,
shifts in First Amendment doctrine seem desirable to assist citizens in ascertaining truth . . .
it is important not to fundamentally rework First Amendment doctrine, which also serves as
a bulwark against government censorship and oppression potentially undertaken in an
ostensible effort to battle ‘fake news’”). Professor Wu may be somewhat more open to a
relaxation of doctrine in this regard. Wu, supra note 4, at 23. Although, for example, he
“personally would not favor the creation of a fairness doctrine for social media or other parts
of the web,” in part because such a law “would be . . . too prone to manipulation,” his focus
on “the increasing scarcity of human attention, the rise to dominance of a few major
platforms, and the pervasive evidence of negative effects on our democratic life,” seem to
have led him to this conclusion: “To handle the political speech challenges of our time, I
suggest that the First Amendment must be interpreted to give wide latitude for new measures
to advance listener interests, including measures that protect some speakers from others.” Id.
at 23, 26.
17. Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and
Somewhat Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1128 (2006).
18. Id.
19. 559 U.S. 229, 256 (2010).
20. See Varat, supra note 17, at 1129–32.
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by which Congress criminalized lying about having received military
medals, arrived before the Court on review of a federal prosecution of
Xavier Alvarez for falsely claiming that he had received the Congressional
Medal of Honor.21 Interpreting the Act as limited to a prohibition on lies
about this topic, the Court nonetheless decided, in a fractured decision, that
the Act constituted an abridgment of the freedom of speech.22
Extended attention to that decision may be justified to reflect on just how
little regulatory power to punish lies it ultimately eliminated; what effect
offering protection to some lies within the scope of the decision might have
on the proliferation of false statements of fact; and, perhaps of most
importance, what the decision signals for both future doctrinal
developments and efforts to combat falsehood that are beyond the direct
control of First Amendment rulings. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion for
four, and Justice Breyer’s opinion concurring only in the judgment for
himself and Justice Kagan, rejected, for separate reasons, the Government’s
contention (based on lots of language in previous Court opinions) that lies
are categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.23 For Justice
Kennedy, the Act was a presumptively impermissible, content-based
restriction24 that needed to undergo strict scrutiny, which it could not
survive, largely because it was not narrowly tailored in two respects.25
21. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 714–15 (2012).
22. For an excellent discussion of this case and its broader implications, see Helen
Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161.
23. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 716–22; id. at 732–36 (Breyer, J., concurring).
24. My distinguished colleague Professor Shiffrin disagrees with the view that
restrictions on lying are content-based restrictions. SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH
MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 125–35 (2014). Her powerful and nuanced
book offers an original deontological case both for why freedom of speech deserves special
solicitude and why lies (not just false statements or deception, but insincere, deliberate
assertions of what the speaker does not believe) are morally wrong and therefore (with
important exceptions) should be more readily subject to regulation than many believe. Her
own summary of her argument is roughly this:
[T]he lie’s primary moral defect is that it subverts the reliability of a special,
uniquely precise mechanism for the conveyance of our mental contents.
Reliable, sincere speech enables sophisticated forms of self-understanding,
knowledge of others and of the world, moral agency, and personal relations of
trust. The relation between communication and these foundational compulsory
ends explains the strong presumption of sincere communication as well as our
responsibility to strive for accuracy.
[T]his relation also supplies the foundations of freedom of speech.
Affording opportunities for the sincere externalization of one’s mental contents
and access to others’ mental contents, and enabling the dynamic interchange
between them is an essential social condition of freedom of thought, the

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/4

2018]

FALSEHOODS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

41

First, its “sweeping, quite unprecedented reach” allowed suppression of
“all false statements on this one subject in almost limitless times and
settings . . . entirely without regard to whether the lie was made for the
purpose of material gain.”26 Upholding such a government power had “no
clear limiting principle” and, referencing George Orwell’s classic book
Nineteen Eighty-Four, “[o]ur constitutional tradition stands against the idea
that we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”27 Justice Kennedy invoked the
perceived core principles of that tradition and contended that
[w]ere the Court to hold that the interest in truthful discourse
alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any
evidence that the speech was used to gain a material advantage,
it would give government a broad censorial power
unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional
tradition.28
Indeed, just the “mere potential for the exercise of that power casts . . . a
chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and
discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom.”29 In particular, in this
instance the government failed to demonstrate “a direct causal link between
the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented,” providing “no
evidence to support its claim that the public’s general perception of military
awards is diluted by false claims” like Alvarez’s.30 Naturally, this leaves
open in future cases both the power of the government to punish lies when
stronger evidence of causal connection to material harm is provided and
what the Court will be prepared to recognize as material harm.
development of the capacities of the thinker, and the development of moral
agency. It therefore is an individual human right and among the prerequisite
social conditions for a just society.
Id. at 186. Professor Shiffrin argues that the regulation of lies is not content-based
because the
impetus for regulation does not stem from disagreement with the content of the
speech or from a worry about how others react to its content, but rather from
the fact that insincere, but seriously presented, representations interfere with
our ready, reliable ability to transmit our mental contents, whatever they may
be, and have them taken as testimonial warrants of our beliefs.
Id. at 126.
25. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724.
26. Id. at 722–23.
27. Id. at 723.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 725, 726.
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Second, the government did not, and could not, show “why
counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest”—particularly in
light of the possibility of an accurate government-created database of Medal
of Honor winners.31 Justice Kennedy, emphasizing one of the most essential
and longstanding precepts of the American free speech tradition, further
noted that “[t]he facts of this case indicate that the dynamics of free speech,
of counterspeech, of refutation, can overcome the lie.”32 That was so in part
because the lie Alvarez told, easily detected in this case, prompted “outrage
and contempt” that could “serve to reawaken and reinforce the public’s
respect for the Medal, its recipients, and its high purpose.”33 Lionizing the
Holmes-Brandeis tradition, here in the context of “lies not spoken under
oath and simply intended to puff up oneself,”34 Justice Kennedy reaffirmed
some foundational premises of that tradition:
The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true . . . .
The response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the
uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple
truth . . . . And suppression of speech by the government can
make exposure of falsity more difficult, not less so. Society has
the right and civic duty to engage in open, dynamic, rational
discourse . . . .35
The cognitive and emotional mechanisms by which suppression of
falsehoods might make exposure of falsity more difficult bear intense
investigation for their nature and effect, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, but the recognition of this possible phenomenon surely is a
point worth raising. Furthermore, although the oft-questioned prospects for
the success of counterspeech, especially in the form of rational
investigation and explanation of evidence-based fact, appear to many to be
an insufficient guarantee or an overly optimistic assessment of real-world
behavior, that, too, is an area of emphasis that, while it certainly is likely to
vary from context to context, is, if not determinative, hardly irrelevant. One
might even say, with Justice Holmes, that this is part of the “experiment” of
the robust free speech tradition in the United States.36 Just how effective
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
dissent

Id. at 726.
Id.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 727–28.
Explicitly speaking only of “expressions of opinion,” Justice Holmes’s famous
in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), nonetheless expressed a risk-
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opportunities for successful counterspeech, much less the realization of
such success, must be in order to overcome the First Amendment
preference for refutation rather than regulation is often a matter of intense
scrutiny in free speech jurisprudence and beyond. As perfection will never
be achieved, there surely always will be argument over how far short of
non-regulatory perfection counterspeech possibilities must be before
regulatory intervention—itself far from uniformly effective—can be
justified.
In any event, in another foundational statement that again harkened back
to the “civic courage” expected of individuals in a free society of which
Justice Brandeis spoke so eloquently in his concurrence in Whitney v.
California,37 Justice Kennedy emphasized that “[o]nly a weak society needs
government protection or intervention before it pursues its resolve to
preserve the truth. Truth needs neither handcuffs nor a badge for its
vindication.”38
Without sounding quite as many magisterial or foundational notes
regarding the free speech tradition as Justice Kennedy had, Justice Breyer’s
concurrence, applying his preferred proportionality or intermediate scrutiny
review, nonetheless emphasized some similar themes as he reasoned
towards his conclusion that the Stolen Valor Act “work[ed] speech-related

embracing attitude that potentially could be extended to factual statements as well when he
wrote so influentially
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth [likely the truth of the “best test of
truth,” not truth itself] is the only ground upon which [people’s] wishes safely
can be carried out.
Id. at 630. His embrace of that idea as “the theory of our Constitution”—“an experiment”
requiring “that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an
immediate check is required to save the country,” is an embrace of community risk-taking
that necessitates a confident, courageous attitude. Id. Experiments of this sort are not for the
faint of heart. And his remarkable statement in his dissent in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 673 (1925)—that “[i]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship
are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of
free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way”—surely is about as
powerful a willingness to take chances as one can imagine. One might reasonably ask
whether a similar risk-taking, experimental approach also should apply to strong
presumptive reliance on refutation of false statements of fact.
37. 274 U.S. 357, 372–80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
38. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 729.
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harm . . . out of proportion to its justifications.”39 Although he
acknowledged that “false statements about easily verifiable facts” that are
not about “philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and the
like” are “less likely than are true factual statements to make a valuable
contribution to the marketplace of ideas,”40 he was more explicit than
Justice Kennedy had been that
[f]alse factual statements can serve useful human objectives, for
example: in social contexts, where they may prevent
embarrassment, protect privacy, shield a person from prejudice,
provide the sick with comfort, or preserve a child’s innocence; in
public contexts, where they may stop a panic or otherwise
preserve calm in the face of danger; and even in technical,
philosophical, and scientific contexts, where (as Socrates’
methods suggest) examination of a false statement (even if made
deliberately to mislead) can promote a form of thought that
ultimately helps realize the truth.41
In addition to recognizing the utility of some false factual statements,
Justice Breyer considered the common concern that “the threat of criminal
prosecution for making a false statement can inhibit the speaker from
making true statements, thereby ‘chilling’ a kind of speech that lies at the
First Amendment’s heart,” as well as the concern that “the pervasiveness of
false statements, made for better or worse motives, made thoughtlessly or
deliberately, made with or without accompanying harm, provides a weapon
to a government broadly empowered to prosecute falsity without more” and
risks dangerously selective prosecution of the unpopular.42 As a result,
Justice Breyer was led “to believe that the statute as written risks significant
First Amendment harm.”43 That risk could not be justified by the desire to
eliminate lies, even as to this one subject, when this unusual Act failed to
narrow its application—as most other regulations of false statements do—
by requiring “a showing that the false statement caused specific harm or at
least was material, or” covered only lies “most likely to be harmful or [in]
contexts where such lies are most likely to cause harm.”44

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 731–32.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 733–34.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 738.
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Justice Breyer also recognized a special concern that the Act “also
applies in political contexts, where although such lies are more likely to
cause harm, the risk of censorious selectivity by prosecutors is also high.”45
In political contexts, the necessary statutory narrowing “will not always be
easy to achieve,” and “a false statement is more likely to make a behavioral
difference (say, by leading the listeners to vote for the speaker).”46
Simultaneously, however, in the political context “criminal prosecution is
particularly dangerous (say, by radically changing a potential election
result) . . . and consequently can more easily result in censorship of
speakers and their ideas.”47 Notably, he did not express any view about the
validity of lower court cases that had upheld “roughly comparable but
narrowly tailored statutes in political contexts,”48 but clearly those statutes
and cases were not far back in either his mind or those of the other Justices.
And no doubt those cases will present much more difficult tradeoffs than
the Stolen Valor Act did.
Justice Alito’s dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, contended
that the Act was sufficiently narrow and adequately served a sufficiently
important government interest. Notably, he rejected any claim that the “lies
covered by the Stolen Valor Act” had any sort of “intrinsic value.”49 He did
agree that there were times when false factual statements should receive
First Amendment protection, but only for the instrumental reason “to
prevent the chilling of other, valuable speech.”50 Like the other Justices,
however, the concern about deterrence of valuable speech led him to
express views that would seem to immunize falsehoods—or at least afford
them “a degree of instrumental constitutional protection”51—in large swaths
of public life, about subjects that Professor Mark Tushnet likely would
describe as involving “ideologically inflected factual claims.”52 His
acknowledgment in that regard actually seems of much greater importance
than his willingness to uphold the Stolen Valor Act. That acknowledgement
resided in these passages:
45. Id. at 736.
46. Id. at 738.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 750 (Alito, J., dissenting). As Justice Alito essentially acknowledged,
however, the plurality and the concurrence took a different view. Id. at 748–49, 749 n.14.
50. Id. at 751.
51. Id.
52. Mark Tushnet, “Telling Me Lies”: The Constitutionality of Regulating False
Statements of Fact 18 (Harv. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper Series, Paper
No. 11-02), http://ssrn.com/abstracts=1737930.
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[T]here are broad areas in which any attempt by the state to
penalize purportedly false speech would present a grave and
unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful speech. Laws
restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, history,
the social sciences, the arts, and other matters of public concern
would present such a threat. The point is not that there is no such
thing as truth or falsity in these areas or that the truth is always
impossible to ascertain, but rather that it is perilous to permit the
state to be the arbiter of truth . . . . Allowing the state to
proscribe false statements in these areas also opens the door for
the state to use its power for political ends. Statements about
history illustrate this point. If some false statements about
historical events may be banned, how certain must it be that a
statement is false before the ban may be upheld? And who
should make that calculation? . . . [T]he potential for abuse of
power in these areas is simply too great.53
Though Justice Alito did not think that the lies prohibited by the Stolen
Valor Act fell into any portion of those “broad areas,” it should not be
missed that the Court remained unanimous in its view that the fear of
government abuse in seeking to regulate falsehoods must be a salient, often
overriding factor in limiting regulation of them. The Justices’ common
ground also included attention to the need for regulation of lies to be
sufficiently narrow in coverage to avoid free speech problems generally and
attention to both the effectiveness of counterspeech and the effectiveness of
regulation in controlling the spread of lies.
The mismatch between the arguably narrow context of Alvarez’s lies and
the Court’s broad analysis, justified no doubt by its consideration of the
validity of the entire Act (given that Congress chose to extend its coverage
so categorically), is quite stark. Had the circumstances presented only an
as-applied challenge, or, put differently, had the Act been drafted or
interpreted only to apply to the circumstances in the Alvarez case, what
might have been more apparent is that the Court only extended First
Amendment protection to a self-aggrandizing, autobiographical lie54 that
53. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 751–52 (Alito, J. dissenting).
54. For a developed argument, made just before the Supreme Court decided Alvarez,
that if “the First Amendment is designed, at least in part, to preserve individual autonomy,”
autobiographical lies that do not result in cognizable harm to others “merit at least some
degree of constitutional protection, since they represent a significant means by which we
craft and calibrate the personas we present to others,” see David Han, Autobiographical Lies
and the First Amendment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 130 (2012). But see SHIFFRIN, supra note
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was uttered without seeking material gain, in a context where the lie was
both relatively easily detected and relatively easily refuted. Thus, while the
Court did treat the case as one where a good deal more was at stake than
Alvarez’s lie, it remains unclear how the Court will react in much more
difficult cases, like those where regulation condemns election lies, either
broadly or in a more narrowly tailored fashion reflecting time and
circumstance to protect the integrity of honest and fair electoral processes.
In the end, the Alvarez decision, despite its constitutional disapproval of
laws that would restrict lies in the way the Stolen Valor Act did, is unlikely
to increase the volume of harmful lies to which our society and polity will
be subject. Its generative potential, and its firm roots in some foundational
elements of the American free speech tradition, could have extended impact
in future rulings, but for now there is no particular reason to believe that it
let loose a growing culture of lying. That is particularly so to the extent that
all the Justices expressed at least some concern that suppression of falsity
might also suppress truth in some measure, leaving us with the sense that
we are unsure what the appropriate tradeoff should be (if there is to be a
tradeoff) between any reduction in the spread of falsehoods that their
regulation might produce and any reduction in the spread of truth that the
same regulation might deter. Perhaps more to the point, it seems rather
farfetched to believe that a carefully reasoned First Amendment ruling that
would not allow Mr. Alvarez to be punished for his pathetic claim would be
more likely to provoke more people to lie than to elicit more moral and
social condemnation of liars.55

24, at 144–51, who maintains that legal regulation of such lies does not violate any “selfdefinition” component of freedom of speech, but that autobiographical lies like Alvarez’s
“nonetheless ought to be legally accommodated as a measure of meaningful social
inclusivity and an expression of a tolerant conception of political equality.” Id. at 157–58.
55. Professor Shiffrin offers a contingently different assessment when comparing the
relative effectiveness of refutation and regulation in efforts to reduce the spread of lying in
our culture:
Whether by government or individuals, counter-speech castigating lying may
help dispel the impression that deliberate misrepresentation is acceptable and
help keep moral morale and resolve high. But, counter-speech cannot dispel the
impression that it is legally discretionary whether to misrepresent (and so
acceptable in that way). More importantly, it cannot work against the
unreliability of the speaker that the speaker’s own misrepresentation introduces.
Whereas, if legal regulation were effective in motivating (some) speakers not to
misrepresent and in establishing public recognition of a collective interest in
truthful speech, in these ways it would be qualitatively more effective than
counter-speech.
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II. The Challenges of Modern Epidemic Falsity
What, then, is to be made of the new threats to truth (and old ones) that
are not from identifiable speakers whose lies may be detected readily and
are likely to excite more contempt than adulation, but rather from
voluminous and frequently anonymous sources that seek to persuade or
confuse listeners into believing falsehoods that can undermine significant
decision-making processes in their public and private lives, and that are not
easily rebutted in an effective way? For the scholars and others who rightly
worry about such threats, the observation delineated in Part I that free
speech doctrine has not done much to facilitate falsehoods or their
acceptance provides little comfort, even if correct. A litany of obstacles to
the emergence and acceptance of factual truth in the face of an onslaught of
false statements—particularly when deliberately made in a campaign to
obscure the truth or, at least, to sow doubt about what can and cannot be
believed—is an ancient problem of the human condition.56 Today, however,
this age-old problem is exacerbated by technology. It is the challenge of
addressing that problem that concerns so many. For all the education we
seek to provide that is aimed at honoring and investigating truth, our
success threatens to be thwarted to some unknown degree by those who
would relentlessly propagate false information for their own ends, using
increasingly sophisticated technological weapons of cheap speech.
As recent events and reports suggest, that onslaught can take a number of
forms. One is deployment of communicators who work for or support
foreign or domestic political groups or governments to post false reports on
the internet, especially on websites that have tens and sometimes hundreds
SHIFFRIN, supra note 24, at 139. But will legal regulation actually have a significant salutary
effect? And even if the public needs to recognize more than it currently does “a collective
interest in truthful speech,” a proposition that may be doubted despite many instances of that
proposition being honored more in the breach than the observance, is legal regulation of
lying really likely to have much of an impact on bolstering that recognition? I have my
doubts.
As a separate matter, before completing the tally of falsehood debits and credits
attributable to free speech jurisprudence, a ledger entry for truth should be recorded for First
Amendment limits on deceptions perpetrated by the government, especially the wellestablished First Amendment rule from such cases as West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977),
that the government may not compel its citizens to profess the government’s message as
though it were the citizens’ own—a protection against being required to speak falsely. Varat,
supra note 17, at 1132–40.
56. Recall Machiavelli, for example, or any of your favorite deceitful rulers from
history.
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of millions of subscribers.57 Perhaps even more insidious, the use of
automated “bots” to deliver false messages en masse to micro-targeted
voters, as if those messages were the product of actual investigative
reporting, can exacerbate the undermining of the legitimacy of electoral
choices.58 And false information attacks can be launched against reputable
news outlets that actually have done the sort of fact investigation on which
we often rely, designed to undermine both reporting that is likely to be
closer to the truth and the reporters and news outlets who seek to inform the
public as accurately as possible.59
The aim of these tactics may be to favor a political outcome or simply to
sow confusion so that the political process as a whole loses the trust of the
electorate. If people do not know what to believe is true, the risk that
credible sources will be disbelieved as readily as untrustworthy ones may
rise to a level that makes spreading truth more difficult. Hence, the
cognitive capacities of the audience can be overwhelmed by what Professor
Wu calls the “flooding” technique of speech control—where false reports
are disseminated repeatedly as if they were true—which results in the
audience either not knowing what to believe or simply refusing to pay
attention anymore in an attempt to avoid information overload.60 The
absence of any sort of meaningful journalistic review only exacerbates the
problem, allowing much false, uninvestigated information to be conveyed
and sowing confusion about what is true and what is not.
How successful are these tactics likely to be? Or, to put it differently,
why and how is demonstrably true information often overcome by factually
erroneous information, at least for a critical time (such as before an
election), and often for a long time? Much common sense and scholarly
research has been directed at understanding how false statements of fact
find and maintain acceptance, even when true information may have been
presented or is at least available for review. Answers to these questions can
perhaps begin to suggest, if possible, how best to respond to campaigns to
deceive or confuse.

57. See generally Hasen, supra, note 6; Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the
Internet?, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2017, at 63; Wu, supra, note 4.
58. See sources cited supra note 57.
59. See, e.g., Paul Farhi, Sinclair Attacks CNN with Video Alleging ‘Hypocrisy’ in ‘Fake
News’ Debate, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
lifestyle/style/sinclair-attacks-cnn-with-video-alleging-hypocrisy-in-fake-news-debate/2018/
04/10/d071a2de-3cf7-11e8-974f-aacd97698cef_story.html?utm_term=.314622db40e3.
60. Wu, supra note 4, at 15–17.
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For purposes of this Essay, human limitations that make for the
successful spread and acceptance of falsehoods might be divided into the
cognitive and the psychological, or some combination of the two. On the
cognitive side, one might think of speed, volume, and a kind of first mover
advantage. In his “Essay on the Art of Political Lying” in 1710, Jonathan
Swift famously wrote, “Falsehood flies, and truth comes limping after it, so
that when men come to be undeceived, it is too late; the jest is over, and the
tale hath had its effect . . . .”61 If that was true in 1710, is it even truer today
when falsehoods can fly at the speed of the internet? Perhaps, though, if
deception can be viral, why can’t correction be viral as well? The simplest
answer to that question is that people need to pay attention to the viral
correction as much or more than they pay attention to the viral deception.
But first impressions are not easy to dislodge, and so the aggressive false
statement has something like a first mover advantage.
Theoretically, the truth could make the first move, and no doubt often it
does. Yet it frequently will be difficult to anticipate what sort of falsehood
campaign will be mounted, and, as a result, the truth is often placed in a
reactive, defensive posture. Furthermore, when a high volume of false
reports flood social media, listeners may be inclined toward believing the
widely reported message, subject to a healthy skepticism concerning the
ubiquity of the practice. But, then, what will they believe? Listeners will
need to have both the determination and the capacity in time and effort to
seek out the truth. Moreover, a healthy skepticism may ultimately become
an unhealthy cynicism, which may be more than enough to satisfy those
who seek to confuse and distort.
With respect to the more psychological dynamics of willingness or
readiness to accept the veracity of false factual statements, a burgeoning
literature indicates that acceptance of false statements implicates much
more than what can be shown to be demonstrably true or false.62 As an
insightful portion of the lyrics from the classic Simon & Garfunkel song
“The Boxer” suggests, “all lies and jests, still a man hears what he wants to
hear and disregards the rest.”63 Academic research might call that readily
observable phenomenon a product of confirmation bias, biased assimilation,

61. Jonathan Swift, Political Lying, in 3 ENGLISH PROSE: SELECTIONS 405, 408 (Henry
Craik ed., 1906), https://archive.org/details/englishprosesele03craiuoft.
62. See Zachary S. Price, Our Imperiled Absolutist First Amendment, 20 PA. J. CONST.
L. (forthcoming 2018).
63. SIMON AND GARFUNKEL, The Boxer, on BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATER (Columbia
Records 1970).
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or motivated reasoning.64 Other research tends to indicate that at least in
some circumstances a “backfire effect” may occur, whereby attempts to
correct falsehoods actually may increase the strength of the conviction with
which people who have accepted as true what is demonstrably false will
continue to believe the false facts.65
All these technological, cognitive and psychological advantages, which
can be manipulated to make the spread of falsehoods more pervasive and
their acceptance more likely, pose a significant challenge to our First
Amendment’s persistent reliance on counterspeech as the right response for
a free society to promote more truth and less falsity. Yet in many instances
the same advantages may pose just as significant a challenge to effective
regulation, particularly given difficulties of source detection and other
barriers to enforcement that stem from high speed and high volume
campaigns. Certainly bad actors bent on undermining the truth and others
who sincerely believe false factual propositions and want to propagate them
are not easily going to be deterred from following their inclinations by
virtue of any felt moral need to follow the law. And, of course, regulation
brings with it a number of potential threats to freedom—and sometimes to
truth as well.

64. See Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Does More Speech Correct Falsehoods?,
43 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 71 (2014) (and sources cited therein).
65. Id. at 66; Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence
of Political Misperceptions, 32 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 303 (2010). But see Thomas Wood &
Ethan Porter, The Elusive Backfire Effect: Mass Attitudes’ Steadfast Factual Adherence,
POL. BEHAV. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2819073, the abstract of which
contains the following:
[R]esults from five experiments in which we enrolled more than 10,100
subjects and tested 52 issues of potential backfire . . . found no corrections
capable of triggering backfire, despite testing precisely the kinds of polarized
issues where backfire should be expected. Evidence of factual backfire is far
more tenuous than prior research suggests. By and large, citizens heed factual
information, even when such information challenges their ideological
commitments.
Id. See Brendan Nyhan, The Challenge of False Beliefs: Understanding and Countering
Misperceptions in Politics and Health Care (June 13, 2016), https://www.isr.umich.edu/
cps/events/Nyhan_20160613.pdf (white paper prepared for University of Michigan
conference on “How We Can Improve Health Science Communication,” June 17–18, 2016),
for a further review of what remains less well understood with respect to “the mechanisms
by which false beliefs become politicized, disseminated, and integrated into individual belief
systems and the role of elites and the media in that process,” id. at 1. See also D.J. Flynn et
al., The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported
Beliefs about Politics, 38 ADVANCES IN POL. PSYCH. 127 (2017).
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III. Can We Meet These Challenges and Still Preserve Robust Protection
for Freedom of Speech?
What, then, to do about responding to persistent dissemination of false
facts with the best possible, though never perfect, combination of refutation
and regulation? Can our First Amendment culture and traditions help
beyond their ability to point us in the direction of assuring ourselves that at
least we are always focused on the substantial downsides and limitations of
regulation or refutation, and to compare the operation and potential impact
of the two in each different realm?
Though it may seem a bow to cliché at this point in our free speech
development, it may be worthwhile to reaffirm some of the characteristics
that Justice Brandeis emphasized in Whitney regarding what it takes to
achieve and preserve liberty in a self-governing democracy that depends on
robust public discussion. Justice Kennedy called on some of them in his
opinion in Alvarez, not only when he declared (likely more as a matter of a
description of our free speech principles than as a guarantee of success) that
the “response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the
enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth,” but also when he
spoke of society’s “right and civic duty to engage in open, dynamic,
rational discourse” and when he remarked that “[o]nly a weak society needs
government protection or intervention before it pursues its resolve to
preserve the truth.”66 Brandeis had associated himself with the views of
those “who won our independence by revolution” who, among other things,
“believed . . . courage to be the secret of liberty” and who understood “that
the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people” and “that public
discussion is a political duty.”67 Those revolutionaries, in Justice Brandeis’s
understanding, also “knew . . . that repression breeds hate; that hate
menaces stable government; . . . and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones.”68
Reliance on civic courage in the form of willingness to tolerate the risk
of substantial evils from harmful speech, at least so long as the “evil
apprehended is” not “so imminent that it may befall before there is
opportunity for full discussion,” was and is paired with a civic duty to
respond with good counsels.69 People remaining “inert” in the face of

66.
67.
68.
69.

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727–29 (2012).
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 377.
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harmful speech—failing to respond—is an unacceptable “menace.” And the
serious dangers of repression must always be borne in mind.70
Even though Brandeis was speaking of political opinions and was not
likely focused on remedies for false factual statements, the dispositions on
which he focused can easily be taken to be directly relevant to the latter.
Notably, contributions to this symposium and other like efforts manifest
precisely some of those characteristics. Refusal to remain “inert” in the face
of assaults on factual truth, performing the civic duty of public discussion,
remaining wary of the repressive potential of regulation when applied
without sufficient care, and seeking the most effective methods by which to
help true information overtake false statements of fact are all Brandeisian
free speech prescriptions that contain enough wisdom to heed. To be sure, it
is the disheartening, seeming insufficiency of factually true counsels to
overcome false ones that perhaps poses the greatest challenge. But that has
always been true, at least to a significant extent, in the realm of political
expressions and has been a problem from time immemorial—even without
the internet. There never could have been a belief that truth always will
prevail, so considerable imprecision about just how much falsity can be
tolerated before regulatory intervention is permitted is inherent in any
meaningful free speech regime. These general attitudes will not decide
concrete cases alone, but they are far from irrelevant to the enterprise of
striking an appropriate balance between free speech and those who would
abuse it.
Consider for a moment a challenge concerning the persistence of false
factual beliefs in a context that we might not think is particularly serious.
The Los Angeles Times recently reported on a group of people in Golden,
Colorado, who meet in person and online at the Official Flat Earth Globe &
Discussion page on Facebook.71 Powered by biblical verses that speak of
“the four corners of the Earth” and “Earth being God’s ‘footstool’” and by
thousands of YouTube videos claiming “the world is flat, gravity is
uncertain, space is fake and the curvature of the planet is an illusion,” these
people resist all manner of scientific refutation and seem to believe that
those who dispute their version of reality are engaged in conspiracies to
falsify the truth they “know” for the purpose of making so-called “flat-

70. See generally Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage:
The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988).
71. David Kelly, The Earth Is Round, and Other Myths, Debunked by the Flat Earth
Movement (You Read That Right), L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2018, at A6.
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earthers” feel small and less special than God intended.72 It is unlikely that
any government in the United States would attempt to impose regulatory
controls to extirpate their false statements of fact, and even if one did, the
common ground in Alvarez would likely find such a provision in conflict
with the First Amendment. The fact that refutation of their false beliefs will
likely never succeed (not even with attempts by “surprising validators”73 to
convince them) does not suggest that repression is therefore justified.
Furthermore, this would seem like a classic instance where repression
would almost surely be more likely to breed hate and potentially menace
stable government than to help truth prevail. Especially where the stakes
might in any event seem low (because the threat posed by these false
factual communications is itself not a threat of serious evil), it does not
require much courage to tolerate what is probably a miniscule risk that they
will succeed in convincing others to the listeners’ great detriment.
Viral deception in politics and dissemination of false statements posing
as serious reporting (what we perhaps too readily and oxymoronically have
come to call “fake news,” even though that rhetoric tends to undermine
“news” as a serious journalistic endeavor ideally seeking to report accurate
information), pose much greater risks, to be sure, but does that mean that
the First Amendment signals Brandeis provided to us should be followed
any less? More vigorously, perhaps, with more urgency and creativity given
the challenges we face today, but abandonment seems highly unwise. As
Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in Alvarez, and as many others have
noted before, in political contexts “although . . . lies are more likely to
cause harm, the risk of censorious selectivity by prosecutors is also high.”74
It may take more courage to tolerate the risks of falsity in these kinds of
cases, and it may be that narrowly tailored regulations could be justified in
certain forms when addressed to particular kinds of problems. But the wise
course still would be presumptively to approach the problem with the sort
of confidence and courage that Brandeis extolled. Risk-aversion is a bad
strategy for maintaining a free speech culture.
We are not left without hope or imagination or creativity with mostly
non-regulatory responses, however, and sustained attention to them already
72. Id. Although patently false, the false statements made by the group are very likely
sincere, rather than knowing misrepresentations of their actual beliefs.
73. Glaeser & Sunstein, supra note 64, at 91, find that if people who are expected to
agree with a listener’s false beliefs instead surprisingly validate the truth, their credibility
with those listeners may move the latter towards accepting the truth and putting aside the
false understanding.
74. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 736 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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appears to be underway. Education of all sorts, including factchecking and
watchdog websites in online environments, can strengthen prospects for
refutation.75 Even if the government decides to reduce or eliminate factbased compilations of information about climate change on its own
websites, for example, private sector compilations can fill the void and
advertise their availability.76 Exposure of sources of false statements of fact,
once detected, can assist viewers and listeners to separate the credible from
the untrustworthy.77 Focused and significant efforts—financial, moral, and
reputational—to strengthen the independence of responsible media
institutions that take honest investigation and reporting seriously can help
make consumers of information more capable of sorting the true and the
false.78 Incorporating some of those journalistic standards into the practices
of social media platforms may also help. We must be careful, however, and
exercise a healthy skepticism about technological truth filters, developed
and deployed by powerful social media enterprises whose accountability is
to shareholders as well as the public writ large.79 But they could facilitate
disclosure of sources with less fear of deterring unpopular speakers than
could similar efforts by government.
Such efforts certainly would not guarantee success in what might be
described as a soft “war on lies.” As Professor Wu contends, it is the
competition for listener attention that may pose the greatest obstacle to
combatting falsity.80 Deliberate distraction and confusion threaten all
manner of attempts at education and honest refutation, however wellconceived. But then neither have rather draconian regulatory efforts in the
now decades-long “war on drugs” eliminated either receptivity by some
people to harmful substances or the efforts of dealers to supply them. Why
should we expect more of efforts to regulate lies into submission? It is one
75. E.g., POLITIFACT, http://www.politifact.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).
76. For example, consider the newly created website, “Silencing Science Tracker,” a
joint initiative of the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School and the
Climate Science Legal Defense Fund. The website tracks government attempts to restrict or
prohibit scientific research, education, or discussion, or the publication or use of scientific
information, since the November 2016 election. Silencing Science Tracker, COLUM. L. SCH.:
SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/silencingscience-tracker/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2018).
77. See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi, How Climate Change Deniers Rise to the Top of the
Google Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2017, at B3.
78. See Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News,” 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
232 (2018); see also Hasen, supra note 6, at 227–29.
79. Levi, supra note 78, at 63–89; Hasen, supra note 6, at 224–27.
80. Wu, supra note 4, at 7.
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thing to claim substantial—though not total—success in regulating
deceptive commercial advertising in open markets. It is quite another to
take the risk of applying the same approach to political false statements,
and we have not done so with anything short of lies for good reasons that
largely have to do with fears of government abuse. No doubt that is why
there seems to be so little appetite, including among those like Professor
Wu who are most sensitive to the proliferation of corrosive new threats to
important factual truths, for anything remotely approaching broad
punishment of lies.
Finally, what of carefully crafted, purportedly narrow regulatory efforts
to curb lies that may not seem to threaten the robustness of our true public
discussions so centrally? Two efforts in particular deserve attention, both
worthy of sustained analysis elsewhere. One sounds in compelled
disclosure on the internet to allow viewers and listeners to have some basis
for assessing the credibility of those who post.81 But rights of anonymous
speech82 are naturally in tension with compelled disclosure requirements,
making any adjustment in the reconciliation of those doctrines in order to
address cyberthreats an area for cautious and thorough examination before
implementation. The other might be directed at attempted foreign
interference in American elections or in distorting public perceptions more
generally, by way of agents or contractors assigned to spread propaganda,
much of it in the form of falsehoods, and often aided by artificial
mechanisms like “bots” to make it seem as though many people believe to
be accurate what are actually false statements of fact. Assuming they can be
identified, can the First Amendment abide the exclusion of foreign sources
of falsehoods on the internet? Can it do so without permitting selective
exclusions that are so highly problematic under free speech principles?
These questions may be open, and they are certainly difficult.83
81. See Hasen, supra note 6, at 219–21; Levi, supra note 78, at 80–86 (including some
discussion of the proposed Honest Ads Act). On the subject of compelled disclosures more
generally, see Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277 (2014).
82. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349 (1995) (stating that
although the “state interest in preventing fraud and libel . . . carries special weight during
election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse
consequences for the public at large[,]” the First Amendment requires at a minimum that any
regulation seeking to further that interest by prohibiting anonymous communications must
be narrowly tailored).
83. For the views of two advocates of such regulation, see Hasen, supra note 6, at 216–
24, and Wu, supra note 4, at 25. But see Joseph Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech,
71 OKLA. L. REV. 269 (2018) (debating the constitutionality of such regulations based on the
First Amendment right to receive information).
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IV. Conclusion
In the end, perhaps our free speech culture leaves us with what Brandeis
thought we needed most: civic courage, a confident participatory vigor to
defend liberty and truth, a constant effort to improve forms of refutation to
move forward our public discussion, and a strong, presumptive resistance to
repressive impulses except in the most extreme of circumstances. As many
know, we have more work to do to adjust to new realities and to understand
how to address longstanding ones. Yet some of the foundational premises
of our free speech culture continue to
remind us of the dispositions we need to
remain free and self-governing, even as
free speech doctrine itself may play a
smaller, though still important, role.
In a wealthy enclave of Los Angeles,
a homeowner has posted a message on
the gate to his driveway. The
homeowner probably intended a
broader and different message, but I
like to think of it as making reference to
what should be courageous, nonrepressive efforts to combat falsehoods.
No guarantee of success, but fighting
the good fight both to preserve free
speech and to defend the truth against
all antagonists.
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